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Abstract—The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human
Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method has proved to be a reliable,
easy-to-use method for human reliability analysis. Calculation of
human error probability (HEP) rates is especially
straightforward, starting with pre-defined nominal error rates for
cognitive vs. action oriented tasks, and incorporating performance
shaping factor (PSF) multipliers upon those nominal error rates.
SPAR-H uses eight PSFs with multipliers typically corresponding
to nominal, degraded, and severely degraded human performance
for individual PSFs. Additionally, some PSFs feature multipliers
to reflect enhanced performance. Although SPAR-H enjoys
widespread use among industry and regulators, current source
documents on SPAR-H such as NUREG/CR-6883 do not provide
a clear account of the origin of these multipliers. The present
paper redresses this shortcoming and documents the historic
development of the SPAR-H PSF multipliers, from the initial use
of nominal error rates, to the selection of the eight PSFs, to the
mapping of multipliers to available data sources such as a
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). Where
error rates were not readily derived from THERP and other
sources, expert judgment was used to extrapolate appropriate
values. In documenting key background information on the
multipliers, this paper provides a much needed cross-reference for
human reliability practitioners and researchers of SPAR-H to
validate analyses and research findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability
Analysis (SPAR-H) method [1–3] was first released in 1995 as
a simple-to-use approach for risk analysts to compute human
error probabilities (HEPs). One way in which SPAR-H
achieved simplicity was through the use of performance shaping
factors (PSFs). A PSF is an aspect of the human’s individual
characteristics, environment, organization, or task that
specifically decrements or improves human performance, thus
respectively increasing or decreasing the likelihood of human
error. Many early human reliability analysis (HRA) methods
focused on the error likelihood of particular exemplar tasks or
scenarios, whereby the risk analyst would map novel tasks or
scenarios back to the pre-defined tasks or scenarios to extract an
HEP. This scenario-based HRA approach (also called holistic
HRA; see [4]) proved inflexible in application and was prone to
mismatches. A different approach (also called atomistic HRA;
see [4]) emerged in SPAR-H and other simplified HRA
methods in which the risk analyst focused not on mapping
whole tasks or scenarios but rather on mapping the applicable
PSFs within those scenarios. The use of PSFs brought greater
generalizability of HRA and greater inter-analyst reliability
through simplified HEP estimation processes. However, early
efforts to document PSF quantification, including SPAR-H,
were incomplete. In order to provide better tractability of the
SPAR-H method to human performance, this article retraces the
origins of SPAR-H quantification.
II. HISTORY OF THE SPAR-H METHOD
SPAR-H was originally called the Accident Sequence
Precursor (ASP) HRA [1], in recognition of its use within the
ASP program of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). The method was developed as a closely related
alternative to two popular approaches at the time. A Technique
for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [5] had been
formally available as a method for over ten years, although
aspects of THERP were available publicly in 1975 in the US
NRC’s Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) [6] and in even
earlier work by the primary author [7]. THERP analyses
required considerable training and topical mastery to complete
[8]. Because of the difficulty in completing a THERP analysis
under strict time and resource constraints, a simplified version
of THERP was commissioned in 1987 and called the Accident
Sequence Evaluation Program Human Reliability Analysis
Procedure (ASEP) [9]. While based on THERP, ASEP
estimates diverged from those in THERP. Moreover, the
technique was often emphasized as a screening HRA method,
meaning its use was primarily to provide rough estimates of
error likelihood for risk determination. This approach
contrasted with the nuanced results offered by THERP, offering
in exchange a significant time savings and greater simplicity in
terms of completing an analysis.
SPAR-H was born out of THERP and ASEP as a further
simplification and generalization of these two approaches. The
original ASP HRA method [1] was refined in 1999 and adopted
the name of the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR)
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models developed in
support of the US NRC [2]. This latter acronym, SPAR HRA,
more clearly delineated the method from ASEP. The 2005 and
most recent revision [3] adopted the acronym SPAR-H,
whereby the H signified that this method was connected
specifically with HRA vs. the broader PRA focus of the SPAR
models. SPAR-H was contemporary to European HRA
methods such as the Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique (HEART) [10] and the Cognitive Reliability and
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [11], which likewise went
beyond the scenario-matching found in THERP, utilizing a
series of PSFs for quantification.
SPAR-H eliminated the basic scenarios of THERP and
focused on just two types of activities—processing and
response. Processing referred to information processing or
cognitive activities such as detection and decision making,
while response referred to activities centered on behaviors and
actions. This dichotomy was retained in subsequent revisions
of SPAR-H but renamed diagnosis and action, respectively, to
make the terms more universally understandable to a wide
variety of analysts. Corresponding to these two types of
activities are nominal HEPs. The context that acts upon these
two types of scenarios is encompassed by a variety of PSFs,
which serve as multipliers upon the nominal HEPs. This
coupling of cognitive vs. behavioral activity types and PSFs
affords a greater generalizability and flexibility to the analysis
than can be found in scenario-based HRA. This approach is not
without hazards, as acknowledged in the method documentation
[3]—the data from which PSF multipliers are derived may not
function in the multiplicative manner prescribed by the method,
nor do the PSFs necessarily act orthogonally. The extent to
which all quantitative PSF permutations and interactions in
SPAR-H reflect actual human performance remains an
important question for further empirical study.
III. ORIGINS OF THE NOMINAL HEPs
As noted above, SPAR-H features nominal HEPs for
processing/diagnosis and response/action activities. These
values refer to the default or average expected error rate in the
absence of PSF effects. The nominal HEPs have remained
constant across all three versions of SPAR-H [1–3]:
• Processing/Diagnosis: Nominal HEP = 1E-2
• Response/Action: Nominal HEP = 1E-3
Note that these values differ from the suggested nominal HEP
in THERP [5] and ASEP [9], which is 3E-2. This divergence is
attributed to the disambiguation of cognitive and behavioral
activities in SPAR-H. The nominal HEP for processing/
diagnosis activities is based on the value found in THERP Table
20-1, Item 4, corresponding to the median HEP for a control
room diagnosis task within 30 minutes. This follows the so-
called 30-minute rule in control room activity—a general rule
for how long operators should have available before they are
required to take action [12]. The response/action HEP was
derived from WASH-1400 [6] and numerous representative
action tasks in THERP [5]. In WASH-1400, Appendix III,
Table III 6-1, the erroneous activation of a switch, assuming no
decision error, is estimated to be 1E-3. This corresponds to an
archetypical nominal response/action in SPAR-H. THERP
provides similar examples of response/action activities
calibrated to an HEP of 1E-3:
• Incorrectly following a written procedure step (Table 20-7,
Item 1)
• Incorrectly selecting an unannunciated display from
similar-appearing displays (Table 20-9, Item 3)
• Incorrectly “check-reading” digital indicators (Table 20-11,
Item 1) or analog meters (Table 20-11, Item 2)
• Inadvertently activating a control arranged in a well-
delineated functional group (Table 20-12, Item 3)
• Incorrectly selecting or activating a locally operated valve
that is clearly labeled and set apart from other valves (Table
20-13, Item 1)
IV. ORIGINS OF THE PSFs AND MULTIPLIERS
A. 1995 SPAR-H Version
The 1995 version of SPAR-H [1] included six PSFs, then
known as operational factors. The selection of these six PSFs
was based on the description of a cognitive model followed by
the identification of factors known in the psychological
literature to affect each step of that model. Using expert
judgment by subject matter experts in nuclear power plant
operations, this list was parsed into the six PSFs deemed to have
the most relevance to and impact on human performance in
terms of detection, perception, decision making, and actions in
nuclear power plant operations. It is erroneous to conclude that
this list of PSFs was intended to be exhaustive, although it was
intended to be more complete than prior efforts in that it began
from a basic cognitive model. The six PSFs were intended to
represent the factors that could influence human performance,
allowing a reasonable generalizability across situations and for
which data could be extracted from THERP.
The six PSFs and accompanying HEPs are featured in Table
1. Each PSF features levels of effect, corresponding to different
multipliers on the nominal HEP. Note that SPAR-H provides
multipliers for each PSF (shown in parentheses in Table 1), not
final or composite HEP values. However, the relationship
between SPAR-H and THERP is best expressed in terms of the
comparison of HEP values.
THERP does not clearly distinguish between processing/
diagnosis and response/action HEPs. For this reason, an HEP
match is usually only possible between THERP HEP values and
either processing/diagnosis or response/action HEPs in SPAR-
H, but not both. Generalizing to the other case in SPAR-H is
easy—in the 1995 version of SPAR-H, the PSF multipliers are
identical for processing/diagnosis and response/action.
Therefore, the only difference between processing/diagnosis
and response/action HEPs is that processing/diagnosis HEPs are
greater by a factor of 10.
Note that for the four initial PSFs—Complexity/Stress/
Workload, Experience/Training, Procedures, and Ergonomics—
all PSF multiplier levels are directly linked to THERP values.
The original SPAR-H development team utilized expert
judgment to arrive at the best mapping of a THERP task or
scenario item to the generalized SPAR-H PSF level. This
mapping was subject to revision as experience was gained using
SPAR-H in practice and as additional insights on the PSF level
definitions were gained. The 1995 mapping of SPAR-H PSFs
to THERP task types is as follows:
Complexity, Stress, and Workload. The multipliers for this
PSF are taken from representative values in THERP Tables 20-
TABLE I. MAPPING OF ASP HRA (1995) TO THERP
ASP HRA/SPAR-H (1995) THERP
PSF
PSF
Category
PSF
Level
Processing
HEP
1
Response
HEP
1
HEP for
Processing
2
HEP for
Response
2
Inadequate
Time
1.0 () 1.0 () 1.0 (20-1, 1)
Adequate
Time
0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.005 (20-23, 6)
High Threat
and Stress
Expansive
Time
0.02 (2) 0.002 (2) 0.002 (20-23, 4)
Inadequate
Time
1.0 () 1.0 () 1,0 (20-1, 1)
Adequate
Time
0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.01 (20-1, 4)
Complexity, Stress, and Workload
Low Threat
and Stress
Expansive
Time
0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-1, 5)
Poor
Training
0.1 (10) 0.01 (10) 10x (20-16, 5)3Low Experience
Good
Training
0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 1x (20-16, 2)3
Poor
Training
0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 5x (20-16, 5)3
Experience/ Training
High Experience
Good
Training
0.005 (0.5) 0.0005 (0.5) 0.5x (20-16)4
Procedures Absent N/A 0.1 (10) 0.01 (10) 2x (20-22, 2)5
Poor
Procedures
0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.05 (20-7, 5) 0.005 (20-6, 9)
Procedures
Procedures Present
Good
Procedures
0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-7, 1)
Poor
Ergonomics
0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.005 (20-12, 12)Old Plant
Good
Ergonomics
0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-12, 3)
Poor
Ergonomics
0.03 (3) 0.003 (3) 0.003 (20-12, 2)Retrofit Plant
Good
Ergonomics
0.007 (0.7) 0.0007 (0.7) 0.0005 (20-12, 5)
Poor
Ergonomics
0.02 (2) 0.002 (2) 0.003 (20-9, 4)
Ergonomics
New Plant
Good
Ergonomics
0.004 (0.4) 0.0004 (0.4) 0.0005 (20-9, 1)
Unfit N/A 0.25 (25) 0.025 (25)Fitness for Duty
Fit N/A 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1)
Poor Crew
Dynamics
N/A 0.1 (10) 0.01 (10)Crew Dynamics
Good Crew
Dynamics
N/A 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1)
1SPAR-H Multiplier in parentheses
2THERP table and item number (where applicable) provided in parentheses
3THERP provides multipliers, not HEPs, for these PSF levels
4Skilled workers decrease the HEP by a factor of two compared to novice workers.
5
THERP specifies that performance is two times worse in the absence of procedures.
1 and 20-23. Table 20-1 represents a diagnosis within
different time intervals by control room personnel for
abnormal events annunciated closely in time. Table 20-23
represents a related occurrence—the time to take an action
for multiple simultaneous annunciators. Thus, response/
action values are primarily taken from Table 20-23, while
processing/diagnosis values are from Table 20-1. Note that
the value for “Inadequate Time” for both processing/
diagnosis and response/action is taken from THERP Table
20-1, Item 1, which sets the HEP equal to 1.0 when there is
inadequate time. Adequate time for “Low Threat and
Stress” is assumed to be equivalent to having 30 minutes to
complete the task (see discussion above on Origins of the
Nominal HEPs). Having more time than 30 minutes
corresponds to “Expansive Time” but is not credited with a
different multiplier in SPAR-H, resulting in slightly more
conservative values than THERP. For the “High Threat and
Stress” case, the 30-minute rule is applied again. It is
assumed a crew will have sufficient time to address up to
four annunciators in those 30-minutes (THERP Table 20-
23, Item 4), corresponding to “Expansive Time” in SPAR-
H. The crew will generally find they have “Adequate
Time” to handle up to six such annunciators (THERP Table
20-23, Item 6). With increased annunciators beyond this
point, the crew may find itself with “Inadequate Time” to
respond to the annunciators.
Experience and Training. Experience and training is
handled in THERP as a function of stress (Table 20-16),
with separate levels of stress for skilled and novice
operators. The difference between the effect of stress for
skilled and novice people varies for action tasks between a
factor of one for very low stress to a factor of five (skilled)
and ten (novice) for moderately high or extremely high
stress. These differences serve as the basis for the SPAR-H
Experience and Training PSF levels.
Procedures. HEPs for Procedures involving action tasks
in SPAR-H mirror the HEPs found in THERP across Tables
20-6, 20-7, and 20-22. Although THERP Chapter 15 [5]
identifies the nominal HEP for written procedures to be
0.003, a careful analysis suggests that this value assumes a
long procedure. Because procedures often do not fit
THERP’s criterion for a long procedure (with more than 10
steps), SPAR-H adopts as its nominal value the THERP HEP
for short procedures, which is 0.001. As more deficiencies
are identified with procedures or procedure use, the HEP
value increments. SPAR-H adopts the step increases in HEP
values found in THERP Table 20-7 although has slightly
different definitions for each grade. The absence of
procedures is handled in THERP Table 20-22, Items 1 and 2,
which contrast performance during checking activities when
procedures are available and when they are not. The lack of
written materials, specifically procedures, suggests a twofold
decrease in performance.
Ergonomics. The various levels of the Ergonomics PSF
for response/action tasks in SPAR-H are a composite of
effects documented in Chapter 14 of THERP [5]. The
SPAR-H PSF is focused on crew interaction with
instruments and controls but also includes perceptual aspects
of displays covered in Chapter 11 of THERP, and manual
control operations found in Chapter 13. Ergonomics PSF
level multipliers for old and retrofit plants primarily follow
those values found in THERP Table 20-12 for errors of
commission in operating manual controls, a response/action
activity in SPAR-H. Ergonomics PSF level multipliers for
new plants are derived from values found in THERP Table
20-9 for erroneously selecting unannunciated displays,
although the THERP values are slightly more conservative
than those found in SPAR-H.
Fitness for Duty and Crew Dynamics. The two remaining
PSFs—Fitness for Duty and Crew Dynamics—were not
readily discernable from THERP as a primary data source.
For Fitness for Duty, little empirical evidence was available
to suggest distinct levels of degraded fitness. The effects of
Fitness for Duty were, of course, well known across
industries and had served as the most significant contributor
to well-known accidents. As such, the SPAR-H method
developers adopted a conservative screening value. In cases
where Fitness for Duty should come into question, a
multiplier of 25 was applied, resulting in a minimal overall
HEP equal to 0.25 for processing/diagnosis tasks and 0.025
for response/action tasks.
The Crew Dynamics PSF encompassed communications
and team interaction in command and control situations,
which had been explored in human factors research studies
but had not been linked directly back to levels of human
reliability. As such, the SPAR-H method developers likened
poor Crew Dynamics to situations in which there is poor
training or a lack of procedures. Absent good
communications especially between the shift supervisor and
the reactor operator, the effect on performance is similar to
what would be expected of a crew that was inadequately
trained or did not have procedures to follow. Like the “Poor
Training” PSF level for crews with Low Experience and like
the “Procedures Absent” PSF level, “Poor Crew Dynamics”
was given a multiplier equal to 10.
B. 1999 and 2005 SPAR-H Revisions
As noted earlier, the 1999 revision of SPAR-H [2] saw
adoption of the name SPAR HRA method and a
terminological shift from processing to diagnosis and from
response to action. These changes were carried forward to
the 2005 revision, by which time the method was called
SPAR-H [3]. In terms of PSFs and PSF multipliers, the
1999 and 2005 revisions of SPAR-H [2–3] are almost
identical. Both feature eight PSFs. The original single PSF
entitled Complexity/Stress/Workload was deconstructed into
three separate PSFs—Available Time, Stress and Stressors,
and Complexity. New PSF levels and multipliers were split
from the single set of PSF levels and multipliers, and, where
required, the original mappings to THERP were revised.
Beginning with the 1999 SPAR-H revision, a number of
new PSF levels were added that accounted for the possible
positive influence of PSFs on human performance [13].
These multipliers were assigned values less than 1.0,
effectively decreasing the HEP below the nominal HEP level
when incorporated in the quantification. At the time THERP
was developed, positive influences on human performance
were not captured, and THERP provides no ready formula
for crediting such influences. Therefore, it was necessary to
extrapolate these positive influences to arrive at a new set of
multipliers. Such values were inferred using expert
judgment and do not have a direct link back to THERP or to
empirical data. To avoid over-crediting such positive
influences, the multipliers are conservative and have a
negligible effect in decrementing the HEP.
The 2005 revision of SPAR-H [3] added two notable
refinements to the 1999 revision. A new level was added to
the Procedures PSF: “Incomplete” was inserted between
“Not Available” and “Available but Poor,” thus infilling a
sizeable gap in accounting for procedural quality. The 2005
revision also added a second set of worksheets. To account
for possible differences between At Power conditions and
Low Power and Shutdown conditions, separate SPAR-H
worksheets were created for each condition. While
extensive documentation on the differences between At
Power and Low Power and Shutdown is provided with the
2005 revision, currently, the only difference between these
worksheets is in their definition of the Available Time PSF
level entitled “Expansive Time.” Because Low Power and
Shutdown activities may benefit from the absence of the type
of time pressure found during At Power operations, this
multiplier is offered as a range between 0.1 and 0.01 for
Processing/Diagnosis activities. The lower value is used in
cases where little time pressure exists, for example, due to a
planned extended maintenance outage.
A comparison of the PSF multipliers in the 1995 and 2005
versions of SPAR-H is found in Table 2. The current
multipliers and their relationship to THERP are detailed in
Table 3. Notable recalibrations of the multipliers are
highlighted below.
Available Time. This new SPAR-H PSF aligns with
THERP Table 20-1, which covers diagnosis of the first event
in an abnormal event for different time durations.
“Inadequate Time” in SPAR-H corresponds to “diagnosis
within the first minute after the initiation of the abnormal
event” in THERP (Item 1). “Barely Adequate Time” in
SPAR-H corresponds to diagnosis within 20 minutes (Item
3). “Nominal Time” in SPAR-H corresponds to a diagnosis
time within 30 minutes in THERP (Item 4). “Extra Time” in
SPAR-H corresponds to a diagnosis time within one hour in
THERP (Item 5). Finally, “Expansive Time” in SPAR-H
corresponds to a diagnosis within one day in THERP (Item
6).
Stress and Stressors. Note that SPAR-H groups internal
and external (e.g., environmental) stress into a single PSF,
which maps to THERP’s stress PSF (Table 20-16). This is
consistent with THERP’s treatment of environmental
stressors (i.e., temperature, humidity, air quality, noise and
vibration, illumination, and degree of general cleanliness)
and physiological stressors (e.g., radiation exposure) under
its Stress PSF. The THERP stress multipliers specifically for
skilled personnel are used directly in SPAR-H. “Extreme
Stress” in SPAR-H corresponds to Extremely High (Threat
Stress) for step-by-step tasks in THERP (Item 6). “High
Stress” in SPAR-H corresponds to Moderately High (Heavy
Task Load) stress for step-by-step tasks in THERP (Item 4).
“Nominal Stress” in SPAR-H is equivalent to Optimum
stress for step-by-step tasks (Item 3) or dynamic tasks (Item
3) in THERP. Note that THERP considers the effects of
inadequate stress (primarily due to inadequate arousal),
which are not addressed in SPAR-H. THERP sets the HEP
for extremely high stress during diagnosis at 0.25. SPAR-H
retains the multipliers even in extreme stress, resulting in an
HEP equal to 0.05, making THERP more conservative for
extreme stress diagnosis tasks. However, it is noted in
Chapter 17 of THERP [5] that there is large variability
associated with extreme stress conditions. Further, THERP
notes a paucity of data on performance during extreme stress
conditions owing to the difficulty and ethical considerations
in conducting such research. In light of the uncertainties
associated with performance under extreme stress, SPAR-H
balances crediting the operator and acknowledging risk.
Complexity. THERP does not directly treat complexity,
which is newly treated as a PSF in SPAR-H. THERP does,
however, cover a number of tasks involving complexity.
The best direct match to complexity in THERP occurs in the
operator response to simultaneous alarms (Table 20-23),
which is included as part of the extended definition of
complexity in the SPAR-H NUREG [3]. Correct response to
a single alarm is given an HEP equal to 0.001 in THERP
(Table 20-23, Item 1), while correct response to three alarms
is deemed to have an HEP equal to 0.001 (Table 20-23, Item
3). This latter point is calibrated as the nominal HEP for
action tasks in SPAR-H. For significantly fewer alarms,
there is an enhancing effect of one order of magnitude,
which is credited in SPAR-H for tasks with obvious
diagnosis. The deleterious effects of complexity captured by
SPAR-H are anchored to two additional points along
THERP Table 20-23. Moderately complex tasks in SPAR-H
are anchored equivalent to tasks involving four simultaneous
alarms (Table 20-23, Item 4), producing an HEP equal to
0.002 for action tasks. Highly complex tasks are curve-fitted
to the equivalent of six alarms (Table 20-23, Item 6), with an
HEP equal to 0.005.
Procedures. THERP does not explicitly provide values
for symptom-oriented procedures. In SPAR-H, the diagnosis
PSF for procedures credits performance enhancement for
procedures that are optimized by being symptom oriented.
The positive influence is extrapolated on the distribution plot
from the negative influence values.
Ergonomics and Human-Machine Interface (HMI). The
nominal effect of Ergonomics and HMI corresponds to the
“clearly and unambiguously labeled” HEP equal to 0.001 in
Table 20-13, Item 1. While THERP offers five grades of
degradation for the interface, SPAR-H adopts the value from
Table 20-13, Item 5 (“unclearly or ambiguously labeled”)
with an HEP equal to 0.01 for the poor level of the PSF.
SPAR-H includes a final PSF level corresponding to missing
or misleading aspects of the interface, which is not found in
THERP. To consider the magnitude of such an effect,
SPAR-H adopts the worst effect HEP found in THERP for
interface issues, found in Table 20-12, Item 6, with an HEP
equal to 0.05. This condition corresponds to interfaces in
which the design “...violates a strong population stereotype
and operating conditions are normal” [5] for an error of
commission in operating manual controls. Note that there
exists a related HEP that is an order of magnitude stronger
(Table 20-12, Item 7), but this HEP incorporates a significant
consideration of stress, which is handled by a separate PSF
in SPAR-H.
Fitness for Duty and Work Processes. The PSFs for
Fitness for Duty and Crew Dynamics were significantly
refined in the 1999 revision of SPAR-H. The authors
referred particularly to HEART [10] for data, an HRA
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF 2005 SPAR-H AND 1995 ASP HRA PSF MULTIPLIERS
2005 SPAR-H 1995 ASP HRA
PSF Multiplier
(SPAR-H | ASP HRA)
PSF PSF Level PSF PSF Category PSF Level
Processing/
Diagnosis
Response/
Action
Inadequate time Complexity, Stress,
Workload
Low Threat and
Stress
Inadequate
Time
 | 
(See Note 1)
 | 
(See Note 1)
Barely adequate time 10 | 
(See Note 2)
10 | 
(See Note 2)
Nominal time Complexity, Stress,
Workload
Low Threat and
Stress
Adequate Time 1 | 1 1 | 1
Extra time 0.1 | 
(See Note 2)
0.1 | 
(See Note 2)
Available Time
Expansive time Complexity, Stress,
Workload
Low Threat and
Stress
Expansive Time 0.01 | 1
(See Note 3)
0.01 | 1
Extreme Complexity, Stress,
Workload
High Threat and
Stress
Adequate Time 5 | 5 5 | 5
High Complexity, Stress,
Workload
High Threat and
Stress
Expansive Time 2 | 2 2 | 2
Stress/ Stressors
Nominal Complexity, Stress,
Workload
Low Threat and
Stress
Adequate Time 1 | 1 1 | 1
Highly complex Complexity, Stress,
Workload
High Threat and
Stress
Adequate Time 5 | 5 5 | 5
Moderately complex Complexity, Stress,
Workload
High Threat and
Stress
Expansive Time 2 | 2 2 | 2
Nominal Complexity, Stress,
Workload
Low Threat and
Stress
Adequate Time 1 | 1 1 | 1
Complexity
Obvious diagnosis 0.1 | 
(See Note 2)
Low Experience/ Training Low Experience Poor Training 10 | 10 3 | 10
Nominal Experience/ Training Low Experience Good Training 1 | 1 1 | 1
Experience/
Training
High Experience/ Training High Experience Good Training 0.5 | 0.5 0.5 | 0.5
Not available Procedures Procedures Absent N/A 50 | 10 50 | 10
Incomplete 20 | 
(See Note 2)
20 | 
(See Note 2)
Available, but poor Procedures Procedures Present Poor Procedures 5 | 5 5 | 5
Nominal Procedures Procedures Present Good
Procedures
1 | 1 1 | 1
Procedures
Diagnostic/symptom
oriented
0.5 | 
(See Note 2)
Missing/Misleading 50 | 
(See Note 2)
50 | 
(See Note 2)
Poor Ergonomics Old Plant Poor
Ergonomics
10 | 5 10 | 5
Nominal Ergonomics Old Plant Good
Ergonomics
1 | 1 1 | 1
Ergonomics/
HMI
Good Ergonomics New Plant Good
Ergonomics
0.5 | 0.4 0.5 | 0.4
Unfit Fitness for Duty Unfit N/A  | 25  | 25
Degraded Fitness 5 | 
(See Note 2)
5 | 
(See Note 2)
Fitness for Duty
Nominal Fitness for Duty Fit N/A 1 | 1 1 | 1
Poor Crew Dynamics Poor Crew
Dynamics
N/A 2 | 10 5 | 10
Nominal Crew Dynamics Good Crew
Dynamics
N/A 1 | 1 1 | 1
Work Processes
Good 0.8 | 
(See Note 2)
0.5 | 
(See Note 2)
Notes
1. Multipliers are not used. Instead, the HEP is set to 1.0 for this PSF level.
2. This PSF level is not covered by the ASP HRA method.
3. The 2005 version of SPAR-H makes a distinction between At Power and Low Power or Shutdown in terms of the PSF multipliers. In practice, the only
difference is that the multiplier for Expansive Time Diagnosis is given as a range of 0.1 to 0.01 for Low Power and Shutdown while only as a single
multiplier of 0.01 for At Power.
TABLE III. MAPPING OF SPAR-H (2005) TO THERP PSF MULTIPLIERS
SPAR-H (NUREG/CR-6883) THERP (NUREG/CR-1278)
PSFs PSF Levels
HEP for
Diagnosis
1
HEP for
Action
1
HEP for
Diagnosis
2
HEP for
Action
2
Inadequate time 1.0 (no multiplier) 1.0 (no multiplier) 1 (20-1, 1)
Barely adequate time 0.1 (10) 0.01 (10) 0.1 (20-1, 3)
Nominal time 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.01 (20-1, 4)
Extra time 0.001 (0.1) 0.0001 (0.1) 0.001 (20-1, 5)
Available
Time
Expansive time 0.0001 (0.1-0.01) 0.00001 (0.01) 0.0001 (20-1, 6)
Extreme 0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.25 5x (20-16, 6)3
High 0.02 (2) 0.002 (2) 2x (20-16, 4)3 2x (20-16, 4)3
Stress/
Stressors
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 1x (20-16, 2 or 3)3 1x (20-16, 2 or 3)3
Highly complex 0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.005 (20-23, 6)
Moderately complex 0.02 (2) 0.002 (2) 0.002 (20-23, 4)
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-23, 3)
Complexity
Obvious diagnosis 0.001 (0.1) N/A 0.0001 (20-23, 1)
Low 0.1 (10) 0.003 (3) 2x (20-16, 7)3 2x (20-16, 4 or 5)3
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1)
Experience/
Training
High 0.05 (0.5) 0.0005 (0.5)
Not available 0.5 (50) 0.05 (50) 0.05 (20-7, 5)
Incomplete 0.2 (20) 0.02 (20) 0.01 (20-7, 3)
Available, but poor 0.05 (5) 0.005 (5) 0.003 (20-7, 2)
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-7, 1)
Procedures
Diagnostic/symptom oriented 0.005 (0.5) N/A
Missing/Misleading 0.5 (50) 0.05 (50) 0.05 (20-12, 6)
Poor 0.1 (10) 0.01 (10) 0.01 (20-13, 5)
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1) 0.001 (20-13, 1)
Ergonomics
/ HMI
Good 0.005 (0.5) 0.0005 (0.5)
Unfit 1.0 (no multiplier) 1.0 (no multiplier)
Degraded Fitness 0.05 (5) 0.005 (5)
Fitness for
Duty
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1)
Poor 0.02 (2) 0.005 (5)
Nominal 0.01 (1) 0.001 (1)
Work
Processes
Good 0.008 (0.8) 0.0005 (0.5)
1SPAR-H Multiplier in parentheses
2THERP table and item number (where applicable) provided in parentheses
3THERP provides multipliers, not HEPs, for these PSF levels
method built on the CORE-Data [14] empirical database of
HEP values. Fitness for Duty was delineated to two
degraded levels beyond nominal performance. An “Unfit”
level featured a multiplier set to infinity, or, more precisely,
an automatic tagging of the HEP equal to 1.0. This keeps the
conservative screening value adopted in the 1995 version of
SPAR-H but makes the PSF treatment consistent with the
treatment of the “Inadequate Time” level of the Available
Time PSF. A new level was added for “Degraded Fitness”
and given a multiplier of 5. This value proved slightly more
conservative than the multiplier suggested in HEART [10].
The Crew Dynamics PSF was relabeled Work Processes
and redefined to encompass a broader range of activities
including plant culture and management involvement in
activities. Two non-nominal levels were adopted for this
PSF. The negative influence was captured in the “Poor”
Work Processes level and aligned with HEART values for
Error Producing Condition (EPC) 21. The positive influence
was captured in the “Good” Work Processes level and
aligned with CREAM [11] values for the Common
Performance Condition (CPC) called Adequacy of
Organization.
Note that in two cases the processing/diagnosis and
response/action multipliers differ for the same level in the
revised SPAR-H. “Low” Experience/Training has a
multiplier of 10 for processing/diagnosis and 3 for response/
action. For “poor” Work Processes, processing/diagnosis
features a multiplier equal to 2, while response/action has a
multiplier equal to 5 at the same level. These values, like the
positive influences that were not covered in the 1995 version
of SPAR-H nor in THERP, represent refinements made
through expert judgment based on the need to attenuate
overly conservative values and accentuate effects that were
undercounted previously. This process parallels the basis for
all multiplier revisions in SPAR-H [13]. Where available, a
mapping to THERP or other available HRA methods was
performed. In a few cases as noted, however, it was
necessary to extrapolate or estimate appropriate multiplier
values.
V. DISCUSSION
HRA methods have proposed up to fifty PSFs [15].
SPAR-H attempts to provide reasonable coverage of the
spectrum of human performance influences in nuclear power
plant operations within the framework of the minimum
reasonable number of PSFs. The decision to use first six
PSFs and later eight PSFs was based on a review of then-
available HRA methods in the early phase of SPAR-H
development as well as ongoing feedback received by the
SPAR-H Team from risk analysts at the US NRC. The
SPAR-H quantification values used for the PSFs were based
on available data within HRA, especially data provided in
the THERP method [5].
The SPAR-H method provides a potent extension of
THERP that allows the analyst flexibility and
generalizability beyond narrowly defined tasks and
scenarios. This approach does not guarantee valid HEP
estimates. It does nonetheless provide a useful tool for
categorizing and quantifying human contributions to risk and
for facilitating risk-informed decision making.
This paper provides a mapping of the PSF multipliers in
SPAR-H to primary data, especially those HEPs originating
in THERP. This mapping improves the tractability of
SPAR-H estimates. However, it must be remembered that
the primary data sources for HRA are not infallible or
infinitely generalizable. A quality HRA should not rely
blindly on the estimates provided by a particular HRA
method, be it SPAR-H or any other method. Rather, the
HRA team should carefully consider NUREG-1792, Good
Practices for HRA [16], which advises analysts to “evaluate
the reasonableness of HEPs obtained” through “plant history,
comparisons with results of other analyses, and qualitative
understanding of the actions and their contexts by experts”
(Good Practice 8).
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